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The excessive fear of being negatively evaluated constitutes a central component of social
anxiety (SA). Models posit that selective attention to threat and biased interpretations of
ambiguous stimuli contribute to the maintenance of this psychopathology. There is strong
support for the existence of processing biases but most of the available evidence comes
from face research. Emotions are, however, not only conveyed through facial cues, but also
through other channels, such as vocal and postural cues. These non-facial cues have yet
received much less attention. We therefore plead for a cross-modal investigation of biases
in SA. We argue that the inclusion of new modalities may be an efficient research tool to
(1) address the specificity or generalizability of these biases; (2) offer an insight into the
potential influence of SA on cross-modal processes; (3) operationalize emotional ambiguity
by manipulating cross-modal emotional congruency; (4) inform the debate about the role
of top-down and bottom-up factors in biasing attention; and (5) probe the cross-modal
generalizability of cognitive training. Theoretical and clinical implications as well as potential
fruitful avenues for research are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Influential models of social anxiety (SA) implicate cognitive
biases as maintaining factors (Clark and Wells, 1995; Rapee and
Heimberg, 1997). The existing evidence concerning biases in
SA has largely relied on faces (for a review, Staugaard, 2010).
Particularly, there is strong support for attentional biases (AB)
towards facial stimuli among high socially anxious (HSA) indi-
viduals. While some studies indicated a facilitated attention to
threatening faces (Mogg et al., 2004; Pishyar et al., 2004), others
demonstrated difficulties in disengaging attention from these cues
(Buckner et al., 2010; Schofield et al., 2012). Significant efforts
have also been directed at understanding the effect of SA on the
interpretation of faces, but have yielded mixed results, possibly
due to methodological differences in dependent variables, stimuli
and tasks. While several studies indicate that SA modulates the
interpretation of emotional facial expressions (e.g., ratings of
the emotional cost for interacting with the expressor: Schofield
et al., 2007; Douilliez et al., 2012), other studies did not find any
differences between HSA and controls (e.g., disapproval ratings:
Douilliez and Philippot, 2003; decoding accuracy: Philippot and
Douilliez, 2005).
To date, evidence linking SA to cognitive biases provided much
information about how HSA individuals process faces. However,
conclusions from these studies are limited to the processing of
faces. Further, some questions are still controversial, in part
due to the inherent methodological limitations of face research.
Social interactions mobilize multiple channels, including speech
style, facial expressions, postures, gestures, and tone of voice.
Focusing research solely on faces raises the risk of overlooking
other channels that are heavily implicated in social interactions.
We argue that the investigation of SA-related biases needs to
be extended to a multi-modal approach (as also suggested by
Gilboa-Schechtman and Shachar-Lavie, 2013; Schulz et al., 2013),
including the modalities that are most important in social inter-
action: vision and hearing. The use of cross-modal paradigms will
allow the re-evaluation of studies using uni-modal stimuli, which
could underestimate the cognitive biases present in real life. To
support this statement, we developed several arguments based on
empirical evidence, with the aim of identifying useful avenues for
future research.
ARGUMENTS
INCLUDING EMOTIONAL PROSODY TO PROBE THE GENERALIZABILITY
OF COGNITIVE BIASES IN SOCIAL ANXIETY
Emotional prosody refers to all changes in acoustic parameters,
such as intonation, amplitude, envelope, tempo, rhythm and
voice quality during emotional episodes (Grandjean et al., 2006).
It is a powerful communication tool transmitting paralinguistic
information, and notably the speaker’s emotional state (Belin
et al., 2004). Research that neglects the latter channel ignores cru-
cial information for interpersonal interactions. To document its
relevance, we will review research on the modulation of attention
and emotional judgments by prosody.
Selective attention to emotional prosody
Efficient detection of salient or goal-relevant stimuli is essential
to adjust behaviors accordingly. Given the limited processing
capacity of our brain, mechanisms of attention play a critical
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role in selecting most important information from the myriad
of sensory inputs. In the competition for processing resources,
emotions have been shown to modulate attention (Vuilleumier
et al., 2004; Vuilleumier, 2005). To date, the effect of emotional
prosody on attention has been mostly assessed during dichotic
listening or during the variation of feature-based attention.
The dichotic-listening technique is an attentional filtering task
that assesses the ability to suppress or ignore distractors co-
occurring with targets. Dichotic-listening investigations typically
involve the simultaneous presentation of lateralized male and
female voices with identical or different emotional prosody. Par-
ticipants are requested to focus their attention on one ear and to
determine the gender of the speaker on the attended ear. Recently,
Aue et al. (2011) reported that, compared to neutral prosody,
angry prosody attracts attention and induces behavioral and
physiological changes (e.g., increased forehead temperature) with
or without voluntary attention. Moreover, neuroimaging studies
indicated greater activation for angry relative to neutral prosody
in the superior temporal sulcus (Grandjean et al., 2005; Sander
et al., 2005) and the amygdala (Sander et al., 2005) irrespective
of the focus of attention. These findings suggest that threatening
voices might be processed automatically by specific brain regions
(but see Mothes-Lasch et al., 2011).
In addition to dichotic-listening methods, several studies
(Quadflieg et al., 2008; Ethofer et al., 2009) investigated whether
brain responses to angry compared to neutral prosody are modu-
lated by variations in feature-based auditory attention. For exam-
ple, Quadflieg et al. (2008) examined brain responses to neutral
and angry voices while control and HSA subjects judged either
the emotion or the gender of the voice. This study confirmed
the findings of Sander et al. (2005) showing stronger activa-
tion for angry than neutral prosody in amygdala regardless of
the task and in orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) during task-relevant
as compared to task-irrelevant emotional prosody processing.
Additionally, their results indicated that compared to controls,
HSA individuals exhibit stronger right OFC response to angry
versus neutral prosody regardless of the focus of attention. These
findings suggest that the OFC might be implicated in biased
processing of threatening prosody in SA.
To conclude, few studies have explored the implicit and explicit
processing of emotional prosody via uni-modal attentional dis-
traction from emotion. The lack of studies examining attention
to prosodic information in the general population as well as
in socially anxious samples is surprising, since the exploration
of these processes could contribute to new insights into the
attentional processing of emotional information. The above men-
tioned paradigms offer an interesting opportunity to provide
evidence from the auditory modality that might be congruent or
incongruent with the evidence accumulated in the visual domain.
Interpretation of emotional prosody
Other studies have focused on the interpretation of affec-
tive signals conveyed by faces or voices. These abilities have
been increasingly studied in several psychopathologies, includ-
ing alcohol-dependence (Maurage et al., 2009; Kornreich et al.,
2013), depression (Naranjo et al., 2011) and bipolar disorder (Van
Rheenen and Rossell, 2013).
Despite this growing interest, we found only one study
(Quadflieg et al., 2007) that probed the presence of biases in the
interpretation of emotional prosody in SA. Findings indicated
that compared to controls, HSA participants present higher cor-
rect identification rates for fearful and sad prosody than controls,
but conversely show impaired performances for happy prosody.
Surprisingly, there were no differences between groups for neu-
tral, anger and disgust prosody, as well as with regard to valence
and arousal ratings for any prosody. These findings suggest that
HSA individuals interpret prosody in a different manner than low
socially anxious (LSA) individuals. However, it should be noted
that this observation is at odds with theoretical predictions of
a threat-specific bias, since fearful and sad expressions do not
specifically indicate a social threat as would angry expressions do,
thereby highlighting the importance of further investigations.
Summary
The lack of studies on emotional prosody in SA is problematic,
since a threatening voice is a clear sign of danger and therefore
a good candidate for capturing the attention of HSA individu-
als and eliciting biased interpretations. The study of emotional
prosody constitutes a promising tool to investigate the cognitive
biases in SA more completely. Presently, it is unclear whether these
biases, which are repeatedly described in SA for visual processing,
are similar in the auditory channel. Yet, the few existing data sug-
gest some particularities in the processing of emotional prosody
by HSA individuals. In addition to emotional prosody, other
affective stimuli could be useful to probe the generalizability of
cognitive biases in SA, notably body language (for an illustration
in depression see Loi et al., 2013).
PROVIDING INSIGHTS ABOUT THE POTENTIAL INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL
ANXIETY ON THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN MODALITIES
Audio-visual integration
A specific line of research addresses the ability of humans to
integrate co-occurring sources of facial and vocal affective infor-
mation. In natural environment, humans are immersed in a
stream of stimulations from multiple modalities. The ability to
integrate these multimodal inputs allows for an unified and
coherent representation of the world and for taking advantage
of non-redundant and complementary information from a single
modality (Ernst and Bülthoff, 2004). The multimodal integration
of affective facial and vocal expressions has led to a growing inter-
est in the literature (for a review, Campanella and Belin, 2007).
It has been demonstrated that congruency in the facial and vocal
expression of emotion facilitates their identification compared to
an uni-modal (i.e., face or voice presented in isolation) source of
information (e.g., Collignon et al., 2008). Interestingly, integrative
processes have been shown to be altered during the emotional
perception of facial and vocal expressions in psychopathological
populations, such as in alcohol-dependent subjects (Maurage
et al., 2007, 2008, 2013). Specifically, alcohol-dependent individ-
uals do not only suffer from a deficit in decoding facial and vocal
expressions, but they also present a specific deficit in integrating
messages conveyed by these two modalities. Hence, their resulting
impairment is not just the sum of impairments in each modality,
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but it is further aggravated by a difficulty in integrating these
modalities.
To our knowledge, no study has investigated the effect of SA
on the ability to decode emotions in audio-visual modality, and
the possible deficit in integrating these two modalities. This issue
is important, as it would suggest that the total deficit in emotional
information processing by HSA individuals would not be the
addition of the deficits in each modality, but would be even more
important, given the over-added integration deficit. Hence, the
closer a paradigm would be to a real-life multi-sensory situation,
the more pronounced might be the biases. Consequently, earlier
uni-modal studies might have underestimated the extent of these
biases.
Cross-modal attention
A second line of research has investigated how signals from
different modalities influence each other in capturing attention. It
has been shown that emotional prosody can serve as an exogenous
cue to orient attention towards relevant visual events. Using a
cross-modal adaptation of the dot-probe task, Brosch et al. (2008)
showed decreased response times to non-emotional visual targets
preceded by angry prosody compared to targets preceded by
neutral prosody. Brosch et al. (2009) replicated and extended these
behavioral findings by showing an amplification of the P1 (an
electrophysiological component indexing early visual processing)
for visual targets occurring at the spatial location of angry as
compared to neutral prosody. These results suggest that emotional
attention can operate across modalities because auditory stimuli
can enhance early visual processing stages.
Several studies similarly demonstrated that emotional stimuli
in one modality influence the processing of emotional informa-
tion in another modality. For example, emotional prosody can
facilitate attention to emotionally congruent facial expressions in
visual search (Paulmann et al., 2012; Rigoulot and Pell, 2012)
and in cross-modal priming tasks (Pell, 2005a,b; Paulmann and
Pell, 2010). Other studies revealed that the judgment of emotional
prosody is biased by a concurrent emotional face despite the
instruction to ignore this channel (de Gelder and Vroomen,
2000; Vroomen et al., 2001). The reverse effect has also been
observed, showing that emotional prosody biases the judgment of
the emotion expressed in the face (de Gelder and Vroomen, 2000).
These studies suggest that audio-visual integration of emotional
signals may be an automatic and mandatory process, as this effect
seems to arise independently of voluntary attentional factors (de
Gelder and Vroomen, 2000; Vroomen et al., 2001) and of the
awareness of the face (de Gelder et al., 2002).
Based on this line of research, one would want to investigate
whether such automatic control of attention across modalities
is modulated by SA. Such research could help identifying the
origin of the SA biases on the top-down—bottom-up continuum.
One could also hypothesize that HSA individuals could be more
influenced than LSA individuals by cross-modal interference, if
that interference can be interpreted as a social threat. These kind
of studies need still to be conducted. The results obtained in
healthy populations also raise the question of how conflicting
emotional information is processed by HSA individuals. This
topic will be developed in the next section.
MANIPULATING THE CROSS-MODAL EMOTIONAL CONGRUENCY AS A
TOOL TO OPERATIONALIZE AMBIGUITY
In the environment, we frequently encounter conflicting situa-
tions in which two modalities convey incongruent information
(De Gelder and Bertelson, 2003). As mentioned, the categoriza-
tion of emotional stimuli is affected by incongruent informa-
tion provided by the second channel in cross-modal situations.
Few studies have investigated such cross-modal incongruence
effects among psychopathological populations. Some studies have
described disturbed cross-modal integration of emotional faces
and voices in schizophrenia (de Gelder et al., 2005; de Jong
et al., 2009). However, no study has explored the effect of SA
on the ability to decode incongruent emotional faces and voices.
Yet, in real-life conditions, conversational partner often do not
provide direct unambiguous feedback about their approval or
disapproval. Such ambiguity leaves room for the socially anx-
ious’ tendency to interpret responses as signs of negative eval-
uation. Recently, Koizumi et al. (2011) used a cross-modal bias
paradigm (Bertelson and De Gelder, 2004) that included emo-
tionally congruent or incongruent voice-face pairs. Participants
had to decode the emotion displayed in one of the two channels
(e.g., face) while ignoring the other (e.g., voice). Results indi-
cate that individuals with heightened trait anxiety were likely
to interpret the stimuli more negatively, putting more weight
on the to-be-ignored angry faces or voices. As a consequence,
manipulating emotional congruency across modalities can be a
powerful way to examine the impact of ambiguity on the judg-
ment of social information and to renew the exploration of biases
in SA.
INFORMING DEBATE ABOUT THE ROLE OF TOP-DOWN AND
BOTTOM-UP FACTORS IN BIASING ATTENTION TO THREAT
Different models of anxiety have questioned the balance between
bottom-up and top-down attention to explain cognitive biases.
First, Bishop (2007) proposes that anxiety leads to AB by ampli-
fying amygdala responsiveness to threat and/or by impairing the
recruitment of top-down attention control, particularly under
conditions of low perceptual load. In the same vein, the atten-
tional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) and recent devel-
opments (e.g., Berggren and Derakshan, 2013; Berggren et al.,
2013) suggest that individuals reporting high trait anxiety have
to engage a greater amount of attentional control under low
cognitive load (thereby reducing efficiency) to attain the level of
performance achieved by low-anxious individuals. However, high
cognitive load can disrupt performance in tasks requiring atten-
tional control particularly in high anxious individuals. Finally,
Hirsch and Mathews (2012) propose that high levels of anxiety
are characterized by an imbalance between (weak) top/down
and (strong) bottom/up attentional processes, the latter being
automatically fueled by threat.
While behavioral studies demonstrated a rapid orienta-
tion towards threatening faces (Mogg et al., 2004; Pishyar
et al., 2004), neuroimaging studies showed increased amygdala
response, exaggerated negative emotion reactivity, and reduced
cognitive regulation-related neural activation to faces in SA
(Goldin et al., 2009; Ball et al., 2012). An increased vigilance for
faces, indexed by enhanced P1, is also well documented in SA
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(Rossignol et al., 2012; Peschard et al., 2013). Nevertheless, most
of this research is limited to visual stimuli and therefore prevents
us from drawing firm conclusions about the implication of top-
down and bottom-up factors in the generation of cognitive biases.
Investigating the presence of biases across modalities offers an
interesting paradigm to provide an insight into the contribution
of top-down and bottom-up influences. Indeed, if a bias is gen-
erated at an early perceptual level, and thus nested in a specific
modality, it is unlikely that the same bias would be reproduced in
all other modalities. Consequently, the absence of generalization
of a cognitive bias across modalities would support the notion that
this bias is yielded by bottom-up processes, whereas its presence
across modalities would rather support the notion of a top-down
influence. As far as we know, no study has yet explored these
integrative processes in SA, thus stressing the need to initiate this
field of research.
THE CROSS-MODAL GENERALIZABILITY OF COGNITIVE TRAINING
Recent studies have shown that training HSA individuals to
attend to non-threatening stimuli reduces AB, which in turn
diminishes anxiety (Amir et al., 2008; Heeren et al., 2012b). It
has also been demonstrated that inducing AB for threat induces
anxiety (Heeren et al., 2012a). These findings support the pro-
posal that AB to threat play a causal role in the maintenance
and the development of SA. However, previous research has left
unaddressed several important issues both at the fundamen-
tal and clinical level. First, there is a need to obtain a more
ecological and complete AB evaluation before AB training. It
should be established whether similar AB are present across
modalities (as posed by theoretical models) or whether they
are proper to a specific modality, hence suggesting retraining
in that specific modality. Moreover if research findings show
that AB appear across modalities, a crucial question would
be whether training in one modality would transfer its effects
to other modalities. This cross-modal perspective can offer an
interesting paradigm to disentangle top-down and bottom-up
determinations of AB. Finally, this perspective could lead to
innovative AB training based on the combination of different
modalities.
CONCLUSION
We developed several arguments pleading for a cross-modal
perspective in the investigation of biases in SA. In addition to
the gain of a more complete and ecological picture of cognitive
biases, a cross-modal perspective opens up new possibilities for
understanding fundamental processes underlying biases in SA.
This perspective might help to determine the stage of processing
at which these biases occur. In this contribution, we mainly
focused on auditory and visual modalities. However, signals from
other modalities, like olfaction, could also influence information
processing and should thus be considered in psychopathological
research (Maurage et al., 2014). Recently, Adolph et al. (2013)
have reported that HSA individuals might be particularly sensitive
to chemosensory contextual social information during the pro-
cessing of anxious facial expressions. This outlines the usefulness
to exploring cross-modal processing in order to precisely describe
cognitive biases in SA.
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